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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW- EMINENT DOMAIN- MASTER FLIGHT PLAN AS A 
TAKING OF LAND UNDER .Al>PROACH AREA TO MUNICIPAL AIRPORT-Plain-
tiff owned land adjacent to the Greater Pittsburgh Airport which lay 
under an approach area for one of the runways. Allegheny County, in 
compliance with rules and regulations of the Civil Aeronautics Authority, 
drafted a "Master Plan," approved by the CAA, which showed the approach 
area over part of plaintiff's property. Plaintiff sued to recover damages 
from the county, owner and operator of the airport, alleging an ap-
propriation of his land because of the substantial interference with its 
use and enjoyment caused by flights at low altitudes above his land 
during landings and take-offs. Upon an award of damages by the viewers, 
the county objected, claiming there had been no taking; but the lower 
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court dismissed the county's exceptions. On appeal from the order of 
dismissal, held, reversed, two justices dissenting. Neither the ownership 
and operation of the airport nor the adoption of the "Master Plan" consti-
tuted a taking by the county of an easement of avigation over plaintiffs 
property for which compensation must be made.1 Griggs v. Allegheny 
County, 402 Pa. 411, 168 A.2d 123 (1961). 
The fifth amendment of the United States Constitution provides that 
"private property" shall not "be taken for public use without just com-
pensation." The Supreme Court has held that the fourteenth amendment 
makes this restriction applicable to state govemments.2 From the words of 
the amendment it is clear that there must be a "taking" before a land-
owner is entitled to compensation. The general rule is that there need 
not be an actual physical taking, but that a restriction, diminution, or 
interruption of the rights of ownership lessening the value of land, and 
conferring property rights upon the public for public use constitutes 
a "taking."3 
The eminent domain provision of the Constitution has increasing sig-
nificance in the air age.4 The Air Commerce Act of 1926, as amended by 
the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, declares, "There ... exist[s] in behalf 
of any citizen of the United States a public right of freedom of transit in 
air commerce through the navigable airspace of the United States.''5 "Navi-
gable airspace" is defined as the airspace above the prescribed minimum 
altitudes of Hight. Under this definition, the Supreme Court in United 
1 There is either an alternative holding or strong dictum declaring that no evidence 
was offered to show that such action deprived the plaintiff of the use and enjoyment 
of his property, substantially or otherwise. Principal case at 418, 168 A.2d at 126-27. 
2 Chicago, B. &: Q. R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897). 
3 See United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946); United States v. General Motors 
Corp., 323 U.S. 373 (1945) ; Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922) ; Ports-
mouth Harbor Land &: Hotel Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 327 (1922); United States v. 
Cress, 243 U.S. 316 (1917): Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166 (1872); 
In re Forsstrom, 44 Ariz. 472, 38 P.2d 878 (1934); Nalon v. Sioux City, 216 Iowa 1041, 
250 N.W. 166 (1933); Kentucky State Park Comm'n v. Wilder, 260 Ky. 190, 84 S.W.2d 
38 (1935) ; Friendship Cemetery v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 200 Md. 430, 
90 A.2d 695 (1952); Forster v. Scott, 136 N.Y. 577, 32 N.E. 976 (1893); City of Denton v. 
Hunt, 235 S.W .2d 212 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950) ; Cormack, Legal Concepts in Cases of 
Eminent Domain, 41 YALE L.J. 221, 225-31 (1931); Note, 16 U. DET. L.J. 46 (1952). 
When governmental action actually destroys property rights, it may constitute a 
regulation-an exercise of the police power, for which compensation is not required. 
Sec Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, supra; Ackerman v. Port of Seattle, 55 Wash. 2d 
400, 403-07, 348 P.2d 664, 668-69 (1960). For articles discussing the distinction between 
regulation and taking, see Abels, Price Control in War and Emergency, 90 U. PA. L. REv. 
675 (1942) ; Cochran, Governmental Seizure of a Business To Prevent Strike-Caused 
Work Stoppages-Regulation or Taking? 19 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 184 (1950); Kauper, 
Wanted: .11 New Definition of the Rate Base, 37 MICH. L. REv. 1209 (1939). 
-4 See generally Harvey, Landowners' Rights in the Air Age: The Airport Dilemma, 
56 MICH. L. REv. 1313 (1958) • 
5 52 Stat. 973, 980 (1938), 49 U.S.C. § 1304 (1958). 
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States v. Causby6 held that the navigable airspace which Congress placed in 
the public domain did not include the glide path for take-offs and land-
ings. 7 In 1958, however, Congress amended the statute8 and included in 
"navigable airspace" the airspace needed to insure safety in take-offs and 
landings.9 The court in the principal case, without discussing the effect of 
the 1958 statute on the Causby holding, follows categorically the proposition 
formulated in that case. The Causby decision places the airports and air-
lines in a difficult position since a long glide path is necessary for the 
operation of large planes.10 The rights of landowners adjacent to airfields 
must continually be balanced against the airlines' rights of free access to 
the airways.11 In the balancing process there is no place for the ancient 
common law doctrine of usque ad coelum, and in Causby the court clearly 
said that it did not apply to modem air transportation.12 The Court in 
Causby instead adopted the rule formulated in Hinman v. Pacific Air 
Transport13 that the landowner owns only the airspace he actually occupies, 
and can object only to such use of the airspace above the surface as does 
actual damage.14 In the principal case the court suggests obiter that 
because the flights substantially deprived the plaintiff of the beneficial use 
and enjoyment of his property,15 perhaps the airlines would be liable for 
a taking if they had been clothed with the power of eminent domain. 
In Causby the United States both owned and operated the aircraft which 
caused the deprivation of the owner's use and enjoyment of the neighbor-
ing property, although the opinion does not indicate who actually main-
tained and operated the airport. Thus the issue in the principal case 
reduced itself to whether ownership of the airport and formulation of a 
"Master Plan" alone is sufficient governmental action to constitute a taking 
of property which must be compensated under the fourteenth amendment. 
The Supreme Court of Washington in Ackerman v. Port of Seattle16 
6 328 U.S. 256 (1946). 
1 Id. at 264. 
8 72 Stat. 739, 49 U.S.C. § 1301 (24) (1958). 
9 For a discussion of whether the federal regulatory system has preempted the field 
regarding flights in the approach area, see Allegheny Airlines v. Village of Cedarhurst, 
238 F.2d 812, 815 (2d Cir. 1956) . 
10 Large airplanes in operation today require a glide path in a ratio of fifty feet in 
ground length to each one-foot drop in altitude. See Harvey, supra note 4, at 1314. 
11 See generally A Conference on Control and Protection of Airport Approaches, 24 
J. Am L. &: CoM. 169 (1957); Rhyne, Airport Legislation and Court Decisions, 14 J. Am 
L. &: CoM. 289 (1947) • 
12 United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 261 (1946). The decision in this case upheld 
the claimant's right to damages from the United States for a taking of certain of his 
property located near an airport because of a substantial interference with his use 
and enjoyment of it by low flights of U.S. military planes when taking off from or 
landing at the airport. 
13 84 F.2d 755 (9th Cir. 1936), cert. denied, 300 U.S. 654 (1937). 
14 United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 261, 262, 264-67 (1946). 
15 Principal case at 419, 168 A.2d at 127. 
16 55 Wash. 2d 400, 348 P.2d 664 (1960). 
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decided that the Port was liable in damages for a taking which resulted 
from low flights into the airport in accordance with federally-prescribed 
regulations and orders. This seems to be the only case in which relief was 
granted on the grounds of constitutional taking where the defendant 
participated in no actual flights.17 In Ackerman, the Port itself did not fly 
any planes, and apparently used no "Master Plan,'' yet was held liable for 
its failure to provide adequate facilities, necessitating the frequent low 
flights over the plaintiff's lands. The court observed that an adequate 
approach-way is as necessary a part of an airport as is the ground on which 
the airstrip itself is constructed, and must be provided so that private air-
space of adjacent landowners will not be invaded by airplanes using the 
airport.18 The Port had the power to acquire arr approach-way by con-
demnation, but failed to exercise that power, with the result that plain-
tiff's private airspace was used as an approach area without just compen-
sation having been paid to him. The use of land for the maintainence 
of other property devoted to a public purpose is a taking for a public use.19 
Because most of the suits are based either on the nuisance20 or on the 
trespass21 doctrine, there is little authority for the view that property is 
"taken" by low flying planes in the approach area. However, the Pennsyl-
vania cases dealing with the filing of a plat as constituting a taking could 
have led, by way of analogy, to a finding that use of the "Master Plan" 
resulted in a taking. The rule as developed in those cases is that the mere 
plotting of a street upon a city plan, without anything more, does not 
constitute a taking authorizing compensation to the abutting owners,22 
because the marking of a street on a city map indicates nothing more than 
an intention to take property in the future.23 But an exception to the rule 
has developed: if the city does some unequivocal act evidencing its inten-
tion to open tl1e street followed by actual work done on it, the right to 
compensation will accrue even if the council fails or neglects to pass an 
opening ordinance.24 In the airport situation it is quite obvious that a 
17 But see United States v. 48.10 Acres of Land, 144 F. Supp. 258 (S.D.N.Y. 1956); 
and United States v. 4.43 Acres of Land, 137 F. Supp. 567, 569 (N.D. Tex. 1956). 
18 Ackerman v. Port of Seattle, 55 Wash. 2d 400, 409-11, 348 P.2d 664, 671-72 (1960). 
10 Id. at 410, 348 P.2d at 671. 
20 See City of Newark v. Eastern Airlines, 159 F. Supp. 750 (D.N.J. 1958); Burnham 
v. Beverly Ainvays, Inc., 3ll Mass. 628, 42 N.E.2d 575 (1942); Smith v. New England 
Aircraft Co., 270 Mass. 5Il, 170 N.E. 385 (1930). 
21 See Delta Air Corp. v. Kersey, 193 Ga. 862, 20 S.E.2d 245 (1942). But see City of 
Phoenix v. Harlan, 75 Ariz. 290, 255 P.2d 609 (1953); Brooks v. Patterson, 159 Fla. 263, 
31 So. 2d 472 (1947); Crew v. Gallagher, 358 Pa. 541, 58 A.2d 179 (1948). 
22 Philadelphia Parkway Opening, 295 Pa. 538, 145 Atl. 600 (1929); Hoffer v. 
Reading Co., 287 Pa. 120, 134 Atl. 415 (1926) ; Herrington's Petition, 266 Pa. 88, 109-
Atl. 791 (1920); Rowan v. Commonwealth, 261 Pa. 88, 104 Atl. 502 (1918) ; Bush v. 
McKeesport, 166 Pa. 57, 30 Atl. 1023 (1895); Whitaker v. Phoenixville Borough, 141 Pa. 
327, 21 Atl. 604 (1891) ; Volkmar Street, 124 Pa. 320, 16 Atl. 867 (1889); Forbes Street. 
70 Pa. 125 (1871) . 
23 See Philadelphia Parkway, 250 Pa. 257, 261, 95 Atl. 429 (1915). 
24 Philadelphia Appeal, 364 Pa. 71, 70 A.2d 847 (1950) ; Philadelphia Parkway~ 
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glide-path is necessary for take-offs and landings and that the purpose for 
which the airport was constructed cannot be effectuated without such a 
path. The condemnation of land and the construction of the airport is 
the beginning of the project necessary for flights. It is an unequivocal 
indication of the intention of the political subdivision to open an opera-
tional unit which requires an approach area. As the court said in Acker-
man, the subdivision which is granted the power to condemn should 
condemn enough private property for the total functional operation of 
the airport.25 If it does not and the planes are allowed to use the airport, 
there is clearly an acquiesence by the subdivision in the take-offs and 
landings; this constitutes a taking the same as would condemnation, and 
the subdivision should be liable for any intederence with the beneficial 
use of the property. 
It would appear that the reasoning of the Ackerman case is to be 
preferred, especially in view of the fact that the Pennsylvania Airport 
Zoning Act confers upon political subdivisions the power to condemn 
property interests for air avigation easements to provide approach protec-
tion for aircraft.26 While this statute is not couched in the words of an 
affirmative command to a city or county to condemn all property in the 
landing area, it is indicative of a legislative desire that political sub-
divisions use their authority to condemn property where it is needed for 
the proper operation of an airport. 
Ralph L. Wright, S.Ed. 
supra note 23. See also Miller v. Beaver Falls, 368 Pa. 189, 82 A.2d 34 (1951), where the 
court refused to apply the general rule regarding street plans to the drawing of a plan 
for the construction of parks or playgrounds. It was held that an ordinance establishing 
such a plan without providing for compensation was unconstitutional. 
25 Ackerman v. Port of Seattle, 55 Wash. 2d 400, 409, 348 P.2d 664, 671 (1960). 
26 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 2, § 1563 (Supp. 1960). 
